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I. INTRODUCTION
Trade laws, and especially antidumping laws, are having an ever-
greater impact on international trade throughout the world.' The effect
on trade in the European Economic Community ("EEC" or "Commu-
nity") is a prime example of this trend.2 Controversy and allegations of
1 Dumping can be generally defined as the selling of a product on a foreign market at a price
below that charged on the domestic market. Sandier, Primer on United States Trade Remedies, 19
INT'L LAW. 763 (1985). See also Cunningham, The Current State of U.S. Import Relief Laws-
Increased Importance and Increased Complexity, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY: THE LAW-
YER'S PERSPECTIVE 1-1, 1-2 to 1-5 (J. Jackson, R. Cunningham & C. Fontheim eds. 1985)[hereinaf-
ter INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY]. For a thought-provoking analysis on the current
proliferation of calls for trade protection and a proposed framework for analyzing the arguments for
"fair trade," see Nicolaides, How Fair is Fair Trade?, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 147 (1987).
2 See J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW: THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES v (1986).
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unfairly protectionist policies often accompany the heightened impact,
both in the EEC3 and elsewhere.4 Also accompanying the trend is the
increasing use of trade laws-correctly or incorrectly-as instruments
with which trade policy is set and implemented.5 In the EEC, antidump-
ing law has thus tended to function more as a policy tool and less as a
technical instrument.6
This Article examines whether EEC antidumping law is maturing
into a rational, fair, and cohesive set of rules and procedures while in the
midst of this shift to a policy orientation. In setting the framework for
this analysis, this Article first examines recent changes in EEC an-
3 An example of these controversies has been the heated debate over the extension of European
Economic Community ("EEC") antidumping duties to goods produced in the EEC by certain for-
eign-owned companies. See, e.g., Trade Dispute Looms Over EEC Move on Components, Fin. Times,
Feb. 4, 1987, at 4 (Eur. ed.); EEC Set to Raise the Stakes Against Tokyo, Fin. Times, Feb. 4, 1987, at
4 (Eur. ed.); EEC Trade Policy: The FTA Criticises the Plan to Revise the EEC Anti-Dumping Regu-
lation, Europe No. 4501, Mar. 4, 1987, at 10; Van Bad, Japanese Investment in the EC Trojan Horse
or Hostage?, INT'L FIN. L. REv., June 1987, at 10.
4 See US Criticisedfor Interpretation of Trade Laws, Fin. Times, July 15, 1987, at 5, col. 1 (Eur.
ed.); The Members Are Cheating and GA2T's Watchdog Is Toothless, Int'l Herald Trib., Apr. 1,
1987.
5 See Howell & Wolff, The Role of Trade Law in the Making of Trade Policy, in INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE POLICY, supra note I, at 3-1. In the opinion of Howell & Wolff, trade laws in the
United States assume an even greater role than merely being instruments of trade policy objectives.
"One is forced to conclude that to a degree unmatched in other nations, trade law is not merely an
important aspect of U.S. trade policy-it actually is trade policy." Id. at 3-21.
6 One of the first overt examples of EEC antidumping law being used as a trade policy tool was
the 1985 decision to impose antidumping duties on hydraulic excavators from Japan, in which the
EEC Council ("Council") overrode the EEC Commission's ("Commission") recommendation and
imposed tougher measures "in the light of the present trade relations with Japan .... " Council
Regulation 1877/85, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 176) 1, 4 (1985). While noting that the Commis-
sion's approach in the past had been "largely technical," one report on this case had the following
comment:
The European Community for the first time has introduced an overtly political and anti-Japa-
nese element into its handling of antidumping cases. This emerged in its handling of the imposi-
tion of definitive anti-dumping duties on Japanese hydraulic excavators. Duties have been
imposed-despite the readiness of the Commission to accept Japanese undertaking [sic] to raise
prices-for two reasons. First, ministers doubted whether the Commission would be able to
monitor the trade effectively. Second, they wanted the matter seen "in light of the present
commercial relations with Japan."
Consideration of the state of trade relations with a supplying country introduces a diplo-
matic element into what has hitherto been a largely technical process.
Community Imposes Duties on Japanese Excavators, Fin. Times, July 9, 1985, at 6, col. 1 (Eur. ed.);
cf Vinyl Acetate Monomer from Canada, Commission Regulation 512/84, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 58) 17, 19 (1984)(refusing an undertaking from Canadian exporter of vinyl acetate monomer
because of no similar possibility under Canadian law); Pentaerythritol from Canada, Council Regu-
lation 96/85, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 1, 3 (1985)(though no offer of an undertaking had
been made by a Canadian pentaerythritol exporter, the Council stated that the absence of provisions
in Canadian law for undertakings must be accounted for in determining whether a proposed under-
taking by a Canadian exporter would be accepted by the EEC. The comments by the Council were
later removed by a "corrigendum" to the regulation. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 20) 46 (1985)).
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tidumping law, briefly reviewing earlier European Court of Justice
("Court") decisions, 7 and summarizing legal issues currently being dis-
cussed.' In this analysis, the important role of judicial review will be
shown. This Article closes by addressing the effect of the Court's deci-
sions and the extent to which they have contributed to or impeded the
process of applying the EEC's fair trade rules.9 This Article concludes
that the most recent cases-known as the Ballbearings I Cases-have
set back the rationalization of EEC antidumping law, reinforcing the ten-
dencies of the Commission and Council of the European Communities
("Commission" and "Council," respectively) to use their discretionary
powers to pursue policy aims beyond the true scope of EEC antidumping
laws.
II. EEC ANTIDUMPING LAW IN TRANSITION
A. Initial Changes
The changes in EEC antidumping law since 1979 have been quite
profound. While the EEC antidumping procedures are decidedly flexible
and discretionary when compared to those of other legal systems, partic-
ularly the United States,' the EEC antidumping rules are still considera-
bly clearer and more transparent now than they were before the late
1970s. 1I Since then, the Court has played an important role in the pro-
cess of reforming and transforming EEC antidumping proceedings. This
process was given its initial boost by the 1979 decisions of the Court in
the first set of Japanese Ballbearings Cases ("Ballbearings I").12 These
were the Court's first decisions relating to the antidumping law. Nota-
bly, the opinion of Advocate General J. P. Warner was highly critical of
7 See infra notes 10-44 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 47-77.
9 See infra notes 78-246.
10 A panel discussion during the 1983 Fordham Corporate Law Institute on Antitrust and Trade
Policies of the European Economic Community commented on this point several times. See Panel
Discussion, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, 1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 132 ("the EEC
administration of its laws is much looser and less formal," comment by A. Paul Victor); id. at 136
("officials in the EEC system on trade and subsidies have a greater area of discretion," comment by
J. Jackson).
I 1 For a review of the earlier period, see generally C. STANBROOK, DUMPING-A MANUAL ON
THE EEC ANTI-DUMPING LAW AND PROCEDURE (1980); Didier, EEC Antidumping Rules and
Practices, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 349 (1980); Van Bael, Ten Years of EEC Anti-Dumping En-
forcement, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 398 (1979).
12 The "Japanese Ballbearings Cases" is the commonly-known name for five decisions of the
European Court of Justice ("Court") concerning antidumping:
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the lack of procedural safeguards in antidumping cases. 13 In Ballbear-
ings I, the Commission had refused to inform the exporters (petitioners)
of any details relating to their defense, including: 1) the alleged dumping
margins and their method of calculation; 2) the fact that constructed val-
ues had been used instead of domestic prices; or 3) how injury had been
determined. 14 As a result of this judicial criticism, the existing EEC an-
tidumping regulation1 5 was amended to provide for improved rights for
defendants in antidumping proceedings.16 Thus, Ballbearings I had a
significant impact on the development of EEC antidumping law by limit-
ing some of the previously unfettered discretion exercised by the
Commission.
Surprisingly, no judicial decision ruled upon a substantive aspect of
EEC antidumping law until May 7, 1987, when the Ballbearings II opin-
ions were delivered.17 Despite the fact that there were several hundred
administrative proceedings by the Commission and Council before this
case, there were relatively few appeals to the Court (the only appellate
court in the EEC legal system 8). Those appeals were all decided on
1) NTN Toyo Bearing Co. v. Council, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1185, [1978-1979 Trans-
fer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574 (1979);
2) Import Standard Office ("ISO") v. Council, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1277, [1978-
1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8575 (1979);
3) Nippon Seiko K.K. v. Council, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1303, [1978-1979 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8576 (1979);
4) Koyo Seiko Co. v. Council, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1337, [1978-1979 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8577 (1979);
5) Nachi Fujikoshi Corp. v. Council, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1363, [1978-1979 Trans-
fer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8578 (1979).
The opinion of Advocate General J.P. Warner, covering all five cases, was delivered on Febru-
ary 14, 1979. See 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1185, 1212, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8574, at 8345 (1979). Unless reference to an individual case or opinion is made,
the five Court opinions and the Advocate General's opinion will be referred to collectively as
Ballbearings L For a brief background and summary of the cases, see Note, European Court: Dump-
ing of Japanese Bearings, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 361 (1979).
13 Ballbearings 1, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1185, 1212, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8574, at 8329, 8445-93 (1979)(Opinion of the Advocate Gen.).
14 Id at 1253-66, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 8377-87.
15 Council Regulation 459/68, 11 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 93) 1 (1968).
16 Council Regulation 1681/79, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 196) 1 (1979). For a discussion of
this amendment, see De Smedt, The EEC Anti-dumping Policy: New Developments, 14 INT'L LAW.
223 (1980); see also H. LESGUILLONS, LE REGIMfi COMMUNAUTAIRE DE PRoTEcrION CONTRE LE
DUMPING ET LES SUBVENTIONS 17-18 (1983).
17 As in the earlier Ballbearings I cases, Ballbearings II is the common name for five antidump-
ing cases appealed to the Court after an affirmative dumping decision by the Council. Four of the
five appeals were by the same Japanese companies party to Ballbearings L See infra note 78.
18 A proposal has been made by the Court to establish a junior appeals tribunal, to be known as
the Court of First Instance. This tribunal would take the initial responsibility for cases involving
competition, antidumping, steel quotas, and EEC staff matters. The new court's powers would be
limited to deciding points of "complex fact" rather than legal points, which would remain under the
Court's jurisdiction. Appeals to the Court would still be possible. See European Court Seeks to Ease
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procedural grounds, and provided some minimal procedural safe-
guards. 19
In addition to the major impact of Ballbearings I, which led to a
revision of the EEC antidumping regulation then in force,z0 the other
major factor for change was the completion of the Tokyo Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 1 The Tokyo
Its Load, Fin. Times, Nov. 25, 1987, at 2 (Eur. ed.). For an analysis of the new court's effect, see
Lang, The Impact of the New EEC Court of First Instance in Antitrust and Trade Law Cases 1987
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. - (forthcoming, B. Hawk ed. 1988).
19 It is not the purpose of this Article to review extensively all of these prior Court decisions.
Excluding procedural orders and interim measures, between the Ballbearings I decision and
Ballbearings II on May 7, 1987, there were six more final judgments of the Court on antidumping
matters:
1) Alusuisse Italia Spa. v. Council, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3463, [1981-1983 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8869 (1982)(a judgment dismissing the application as
inadmissible on grounds that an unrelated importer had no right to appeal against a generally
applicable regulation);
2) Allied Corp. v. Comm'n ("Allied P' ), 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1005, [1983-1985
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,083 (1984)(appeals against a regulation im-
posing provisional antidumping duties. The decision upheld the right of appeal for producers
and exporters able to establish that they were identified or affected by measures imposing an-
tidumping duties, thus showing that the measures are of direct and individual concern. A final
judgment dismissed the applications of exporters as unfounded since the Commission had the
right to impose provisional duties based on information at its disposal upon the withdrawal of
exporters' undertakings.);
3) Timex Corp. v. Council, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 849, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 114,143 (1985)(the Court held that the Commission had breached
essential procedural requirements by failing to provide information to complainant sufficient for
it to ascertain whether the Commission had established the facts correctly; the Court annulled
the regulation for the Commission's infringement of the procedural requirements);
4) Allied Corp. v. Council ("Allied I"), 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) t 14,200 (1985)(ap-
peals against the definitive antidumping regulation; the Court found that the regulation required
the Council to assess duties at an amount less than dumping margin if those duties were ade-
quate to remove injury; the Court held that the Council was obliged to decide the amount of
duty necessary to remove injury and because there was nothing on the record indicating the
Council had done so, the Court annulled the duty);
5) Gerlach & Co. BV v. Minister for Economic Affairs, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. - (a
reference from the Dutch courts for a preliminary ruling under Article 41 of the European Coal
and Steel Community ("ECSC") Treaty; rulings relate to the authority of the Commission and
to the prolonged use of obligatory conversion rates for calculation of antidumping duties on
certain iron and steel products)(not yet reported);
6) Continentale Produkten Gesellschaft Ehrhardt-Renken GmbH & Co. v. Comm'n, 1987
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. - (application concerning refund procedures and powers of the Commis-
sion; dismissed by Court)(not yet reported).
Two antidumping cases were terminated before final judgment:
1) Celanese Chemical Corp. v. Council, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1183 (an order ensur-
ing confidential treatment of business secrets in Court proceedings);
2) V/O Raznoimport v. Comm'n, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2573 (an order dismissing
application for interim measures);
For a brief discussion of the most important of the antidumping cases and related background
materials, see infra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
20 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
21 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. See generally Jackson, Louis & Matsushita, Implementing the Tokyo Round:
Legal Aspects of Changing International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REv. 267 (1982).
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Round brought about several changes in the GATT, one of which was
the GATT Antidumping Code.22
To accommodate the changes of the Antidumping Code, the Com-
munity approved the Tokyo Round agreements.2 3 On December 20,
1979, it adopted the new antidumping and countervailing legislation as
Council Regulation 3017/79 ("Antidumping Regulation").24 This regu-
lation entered into force on January 1, 1980, and repealed the previous
regulation.25
The purpose of the Antidumping Regulation was four-fold: 1) to
incorporate the changes agreed upon in the GATT Antidumping Code
and in particular, the more specific rules used to determine causation of
injury; 2) to continue to implement the procedural changes necessary to
meet the criticisms made in Ballbearings I; 3) to elaborate on and
strengthen the criteria on export subsidies (as distinct from dumping);
and 4) to consolidate the legislation into a single instrument, the prior
regulation having already been amended three times.2 6 Marking a major
step forward under the Antidumping Regulation, the Commission and
Council slowly began to make their procedures more apparent.2 7 By
1982-83 the regulations and decisions were somewhat less cryptic, al-
lowing an outside party to understand some of what had transpired in
the particular cases.2"
The Court had a continuing role to play in these procedural im-
provements. The first appeal after Ballbearings I came in 1981 in Ce-
22 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, T.I.A.S. No. 9650. For a brief review of the negotiations and the
effect of the new agreement, see J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 13-18 (noting changes,
inter alia, in the injury assessment standards, price undertaking rules, and retroactive application of
duties).
23 Council Decision of Dec. 10, 1979, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 71) 1 (1980).
24 Council Regulation 3017/79, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 1 (1979)[hereinafter An-
tidumping Regulation]. At the same time, the Commission enacted Commission Recommendation
3018/79/ECSC, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 339) 15 (1979), which governs antidumping matters
for coal, iron, and steel products in the Community, falling under a separate legal regime. See J.
BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 24-29, 31. For purposes of this Article, and since the
general EEC antidumping rules and the specific ECSC rules are nearly identical, reference will be
made only to the EEC rules.
25 Antidumping Regulation, supra note 24, arts. 17, 18.
26 Pitt & Moncreiffe, The Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Rules and Practices of the European
Economic Community, 10 INT'L Bus. LAw. 333 (1982); see also J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra
note 2, at 26-27; Didier, EEC Anti-dumping Rules and Practices, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 349
(1980). Article 14(1) of the Antidumping Regulation was amended in 1982 to provide that review
proceedings could not be held at the exporter's request until one year after the termination of a
proceeding. Council Regulation 1580/82, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 178) 9 (1982).
27 Van Bad, A Practitioner's Guide to Due Process in EEC Antitrust and Antidumping Proceed-
ings, 18 INT'L LAW. 841, 858-61 (1984).
28 Id. at 861.
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lanese Chemical Corp. v. EEC Council.2 9 There the Court affirmed that
appellants could be assured of a degree of confidentiality for certain busi-
ness secrets that were divulged to support the appeal.30
The next appeal, Alusuisse Italia Spa. v. EEC Council,31 was not
handled as equitably. In dismissing this case, the Court barred from liti-
gation an independent importer not directly involved in the administra-
tive proceedings by use of an unduly rigid admissibility standard.3 2 That
standard-a need for the party to be expressly named in a regulation-
was shown to be impossibly formalistic in the next appeal, EEC Seed
Crushers' and Oil Processors' Federation v. Commission ("FEDIOL "),33
which involved a countervailing duty proceeding. Although the com-
plainants had not been named in the regulation at issue, the Court held
that a right to judicial review as to whether the Commission had disre-
garded their procedural rights existed. 4 Some five months later, Allied
Corp. v. EEC Council ("Allied I") 31 removed the question of an ex-
porter's right to appeal when affected by measures; at the same time it
affirmed some of the Commission's discretionary powers concerning the
imposition of provisional duties. 6
An important step in providing procedural safeguards for all parties
involved was taken by the Court in its 1985 judgment in Timex Corp. v.
EEC Council.37 The Court again upheld a complainant's right of appeal.
In Timex the Commission had refused to provide the complainant with
certain basic details concerning the dumping calculations. The com-
plainant was thus unable to ascertain whether or not the Commission
was using the correct facts. The Court held that in failing to disclose the
29 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1183.
30 Id. For further discussion of this issue, see Riesenfeld, The Treatment of Confidential Infor-
mation in Antidumping Cases: A Comment on the Celanese Case, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 553
(1984).
31 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3463, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
1 8869 (1982).
32 See Van Bael, supra note 27, at 865.
33 EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors' Federation ("FEDIOL") v. Comm'n, 1983 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2913, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) t 14,013 (1983).
34 For further background on the role of complainants, see Kuyper, Some Reflections on the
Legal Position of the Private Complainant in Various Procedures Relating to Commercial Policy, 1983
LEGAL IssuEs EUR. INTEGRATION 115.
35 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1005, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,083.
36 For a useful survey of the admissibility standards used by the Court in the light of the judg-
ments in Alusuisse, FEDIOL, and Allied 1, see Bellis, Judicial Review of EEC Anti-dumping and
Anti-subsidy Determinations After "Fediol" The Emergence of a New Admissibility Test, 21 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 539 (1984).
37 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 849, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
1114,143.
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facts, essential procedural requirements were breached. The Court an-
nulled the regulation and required the antidumping duty to be main-
tained until the Commission and Council adopted the measures needed
to comply with the judgment.38
The important principle that emerged from Timex was the Commis-
sion's duty (heretofore largely unperformed) to give all interested parties
sufficient information on the key dumping and injury issues in question,
so that the parties could ascertain whether or not the Commission made
accurate factual determinations. 39 Although the Commission still has
some improvements to make in this area, greater disclosure in most areas
of EEC antidumping practice now exists.40
The last important Court decision before Ballbearings II reversed
the rationalization of EEC antidumping law was the 1985 decision in
Allied Corp. v. EEC Council ("Allied I1"),41 which was a second appeal
in this antidumping case.4 2 In a sense, this decision was an extension of
the principle from Timex that Community institutions are required to
make findings on the record so that the parties (and the Court) may re-
view them, though this principle was not expressed by the Court. Here,
the Council's failure to indicate on the record whether it had made a
determination as to the level of duty necessary to remove injury was held
to be illegal, and the Court annulled the regulation.43
Through these cases the Court played an important role in making
EEC antidumping law more easily understood and procedurally fair.
38 Id at 870-71, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CC) at 15,784-85. One of
the most interesting parts of the Court's judgment was its order allowing the regulation to continue
for the interim period. On this point, and for a general review of the case, see Note, Antidumping-
Redefinition of Confidentiality and Right of Judicial Review-Institution of a New Form of Relief:
Timex Corporation v. Council and Commission of the European Communities, 16 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 179 (1986).
39 In this author's experience, since the Timex decision there is greater disclosure of information
by the Commission if requested by the parties. Although disclosure of the duty calculations using the
so-called "target price" method remains inadequate, the Commission defends its lack of disclosure
on grounds of confidentiality. The Commission has also been requiring parties to submit more com-
prehensive non-confidential summaries of their submissions. Though there is still room for improve-
ment, these are quite helpful developments. For a proposed means to develop these trends further,
see Taylor & Vermulst, Disclosure of Confidential Information in Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Proceedings Under United States Law: A Framework for the European Communities, 21 INT'L
LAW. 43 (1987).
40 See id. Greater disclosure concerning injury and assessment of duties would aid considerably
in verifying the accuracy of the Commission's findings.
41 4 Common Mkt. Rep. 14,200 (1985).
42 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
43 Allied II, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) at 16,222. For further analysis of the decision, see
Pevtchin, Allied 1I: Limits on the Extent of Injury Under the EEC Anti-dumping Rules, 1985 FORD-
HAM CORP. L. INST. 605.
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Resolution of these "first generation" issues through application of foun-
dational administrative law principles have been essential limitations on
the otherwise unbridled discretion of the Community institutions.'
These procedural improvements have allowed parties (and in particular
defendants) to apply principles from previous cases in detailed analyses
of the substantive issues of dumping, injury, and related matters. Some
of these recent issues are discussed below.
B. Development of "Second Generation" Issues
During 1984 and 1985, several pivotal changes began in EEC an-
tidumping law. As previously mentioned, several Court judgments
firmly established the right of appeal for exporters, complainants, and
certain importers. Another important development which began in
1984 was a change in the Commission's methodology for computing
dumping. This change of methodology was first manifested in the an-
tidumping regulation delivered by the Council concerning ballbearings
from Japan and Singapore.46 The Court appeal of this case, known as
Ballbearings II, is the main focus of the remainder of this Article.
Within days of the Council's decision in Ballbearings II, the An-
tidumping Regulation was amended. To support its policy aims and to
consolidate the intended amendments into one version,47 the Council en-
acted Council Regulation 2176/8448 ("Amended Regulation"). The
Amended Regulation took effect on August 1, 1984,"9 and approximately
forty changes were made to the earlier Antidumping Regulation.50 The
amendments were intended to be a comprehensive updating of EEC
trade law policy and practice.5' While certain minor substantive changes
44 For comments on this evolution, see Panel Discussion, Antidumping Rules in the EEC The
Second Generation ofIssues, 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 695, 699.
45 See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text. A useful summary of the right of judicial
review in the EEC may be found in Vermulst, Dumping in the United States and the European
Community: A Comparative Analysis, 1984 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 103, 133-47. For a
fuller background on judicial review generally, see J. USHER, EUROPEAN COURT PRACTICE (1983);
see also Lang, Judicial Review of Trade Safeguard Measures in the European Community, 1985
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 641; J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 241-59; I. VAN BAEL
& J. BELLIS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 4-10,
127-28 (1985).
46 Council Regulation 2089/84, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 1 (1984).
47 J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 28-29.
48 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 201) 1 (1984)[hereinafter Amended Regulation].
49 Id. art. 19. The earlier Antidumping Regulation was repealed. Id. art. 18.
50 See De Smedt, European Community: A New Anti-dumping Regulation, WORLDLAW, Nov.-
Dec. 1984, at 43 [hereinafter New Regulation).
51 See De Smedt, EEC Law: Anti-Dumping, 12 INT'L BUS. LAW. 471 (Dec. 1984)[hereinafter
Anti-Dumping]. Two key officials of the Commission involved with antidumping matters summa-
rized the changes as follows:
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were effected by the Amended Regulation, particularly in the definition
of constructed value and in the comparison between normal value and
export price,52 the primary thrust of the changes were again proce-
dural. 3 Changes were implemented with regard to undertakings,54 in-
troduction of a "sunset" clause for duties,55 and other procedural
points.56 In general, the procedural changes have indeed proven to be
useful in the development of a clearer and better regulated trade
practice.
5 7
By 1985, observers generally agreed that EEC antidumping law had
reached the "second generation"58 (although, in this author's view, the
change came some five to ten years later than it did in comparable trad-
ing partners). Rather than arguing over fundamental procedural rights,
the discussion shifted to: 1) initiation and complaint procedures;59 2) the
Some of the amendments are designed to clarify the Commission's practice in this area. These
relate to the definition of the costs to be taken into account for the determination of constructed
value and sales below cost; the treatment of related parties; the allowances to be granted for
differences in conditions and terms of sale and, in particular, those relating to the level of trade
and to import charges and indirect taxes; the period of investigations; the calculation of the
amount of a subsidy and the rules relating to the treatment of confidential information. Other
changes are of a technical character. These include amendments to bring the terminology into
line with current customs legislation and common rules for imports from state trading coun-
tries. Finally, the opportunity has been taken to streamline the procedures and to make them
more effective. Amendments to this effect are those concerning consultation with the Member
States; the stipulation of time limits for the acceptance of price undertakings; the procedures to
be followed in case of violation or withdrawal of price undertakings; the rules for the refund of
duties on particular shipments and, finally, the introduction of a "sunset" provision, under
which anti-dumping and countervailing measures automatically lapse after a period of five
years, unless it has been shown that there is a need for their continued existence.
J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 28-29 (footnotes omitted).
52 De Smedt, New Regulation, supra note 50 (noting the revised definition of constructed value
as being cost of production plus a reasonable profit margin, and noting changes in the Article 10
adjustments).
53 See De Smedt, Anti-Dumping, supra note 51.
54 See id. (noting an expedited process and time limits for offering undertakings).
55 Id. (generally five years duration).
56 For example, consultations, confidentiality, and termination of proceedings. See id.
57 For a recent survey of procedures in EEC practice, see van Lennep & van Barlingen, Proce-
dural Aspects of EEC Anti-Dumping, 28 Swiss REV. INT'L COMPETITION L. 57 (1986). Certainly
one benefit of the greater clarity of the proceedings, and particularly the details published in the
regulations, has been that the practice of the EEC can finally be comprehensively analyzed. The first
such study came out in 1984. Davey, An Analysis of European Communities Legislation and Practice
Relating to Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, 1983 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 39. Several
other useful studies have since been published. See J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 2; I.
VAN BAEL & J. BELLIS, supra note 45; E. VERMULST, ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1987).
58 See Panel Discussion, supra note 44; Bourgeois, EC Antidumping Enforcement-Selected Sec-
ond Generation Issues, 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 563.
59 Bourgeois, supra note 58, at 590-94.
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scope, and evasion, of duties; 60 3) refunds of duties paid;61 4) review and
expiration of antidumping duties; 62 and 5) matters relating more to the
mechanics of the proceedings than the basic procedural fairness.
63
Based upon the increased disclosure of the regulations and increased
experience with these complex issues, discussions on the substantive level
are now possible." For example, the concept of "Community interest"
as a test in assessing duties has been discussed, 65 although its application
remains rather unclear.66 The overall issue of injury has also been dis-
cussed to a much greater extent than before.67 It remains to be seen,
however, whether the Commission will seriously examine the compli-
cated injury issues with which it has been confronted.68 In several recent
cases the defendants have asserted that the Commission has failed to ana-
lyze the alleged injury fully, and these issues have been appealed to the
Court.
6 9
60 Id. at 595-600. Concerning evasion or circumvention of antidumping duties, the Community
has now amended the Amended Regulation to allow the imposition of antidumping duties on certain
EEC assembled products, 1) where the assembly is handled by a party related or associated to an
exporter found to have been dumping, 2) where such operation began or increased after the initiation
of such antidumping proceeding, and 3) where the value of the parts from that exporter's country
exceed 60% of the total value of the parts used in the assembled product. See Council Regulation
1761/87 of June 22, 1987 (amending Council Regulation 2176/84), 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
167) 9 (1987).
61 See Bourgeois, supra note 58, at 600-01; Panel Discussion, supra note 44, at 699-700. In
October 1986, the Commission laid down guidelines concerning refunds of duties. See Commission
Notice Concerning the Reimbursement of Anti-Dumping Duties, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 266) 2
(1986).
62 See Bourgeois, supra note 58, at 601.
63 Id. at 584-90.
64 See, e.g., Pevtchin, supra note 43, at 615 (discussion on the extent of injury).
65 See, e.g., Bourgeois, supra note 58, at 588-90; Stanbrook, The Impact of Community Interest
and Injury Determination on Antidumping Measures in the EEC, 1985 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
623; Pevtchin, supra note 43. In Allied II, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,200, the Advocate
General suggested that the Community institutions should take a far more flexible attitude towards
the application of the antidumping rules. He was critical of the Commission's handling of price
undercutting, arguing that measures should be applied only when actual price discrimination is prac-
ticed. Advocate General van Themaat argued that the Commission should not have compared ex-
port prices with artificially constructed EEC market prices. Finally, in his view, the amount of
duties should not exceed the level required by the Community interest, id. see. 4.3, a theory which in
essence would combine the injury and Community interest tests. The Court, however, did not adopt
the Advocate General's views completely, ruling solely on the issue of the institution's failure to
meet the requirements of Article 13(3) of the regulation.
66 See Allied II, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,200.
67 See, e.g., Pevtchin, supra note 43; Stanbrook, supra note 65; Panel Discussion, supra note 44,
at 697-98, 701.
68 A major contributing factor in this respect, inter alia, is the fact that the Commission's an-
tidumping services are understaffed significantly. See Panel Discussion, supra note 44, at 698.
69 See Electronic Typewriters from Japan, Council Regulation 1698/85, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 163) 1 (1985)(two of the three Community producers were themselves significant importers
EEC Antidumping Law and Policy
8:365(1987)
Since 1984-85, much discussion and dispute has centered upon the
dumping determinations made by the Commission.7" Where producers
sell in their domestic market and the EEC markets through subsidiaries,
the method of setting and comparing normal values and export prices has
also been altered by the Commission, and continues to be a subject of
sharp disagreement.7 The Commission has also developed a "single en-
tity" theory, whereby a normal value (either domestic price or con-
structed value) is determined at the distribution level of the subsidiary
company (that is, the subsidiary's prices or their equivalent). This has
been adopted even though there is no authority in the Antidumping Reg-
ulation to use the sales companies' prices.7" To reconstruct the export
price, the Commission deducts from the EEC subsidiary's resale price all
"costs incurred between importation and resale" and a "reasonable
profit" (normally more than the actual amounts).7 3 Thus, for the export
price an ex-factory price is used for comparison. For the normal value,
however, only certain "direct" selling expenses of the parent or domestic
subsidiary are deducted, leaving all of the "indirect" selling and other
expenses related to distribution to be included in normal value.74 The
Commission calls this an "ex-factory" price.75 Although it has been
demonstrated that this methodology skews the results of dumping calcu-
lations very significantly,76 the Commission and Council persist in using
of Japanese typewriters, and the remaining producer showed several indications of improving its
position despite certain problems of its own making; these decisions are currently on appeal to the
Court. See infra note 224)[hereinafter Electronic Typewriters]; Photocopiers from Japan, Council
Regulation 535/87, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 54) 12 (1987)(an important issue in this case was
the definition of "Community industry," since by the end of the case all of the EEC producers except
one had links with Japanese companies, and the remaining EEC producer was the United Kingdom
subsidiary of a United States company buying part of its products from a related Japanese company;
these decisions are currently on appeal to the Court. See infra note 225)[hereinafter Japanese
Photocopiers].
70 Aside from the court appeals, discussions at certain public forums have also focused on these
subjects. Compare Bourgeois, supra note 58, at 564 (in support of the Commission's positions) with
Panel Discussion, supra note 44, at 700-01 (criticizing some of the Commission's positions).
71 The Court discussed some of these issues in Ballbearings II. See infra notes 188-223 and
accompanying text. The disagreement has resulted in a number of appeals to the Court. See infra
notes 224-25.
72 See, eg., Electronic Typewriters, supra note 69 (where the Commission first elaborated on its
new theory). Interpretations of Article 2(3) and (7) of the Amended Regulation, supra note 48, are
in dispute in this appeal to the Court.
73 Except for the deductions being excessive in their amounts, this method is sanctioned under
Article 2(8)(b) of the Amended Regulation, supra note 48.
74 Electronic Typewriters, supra note 69; Japanese Photocopiers, supra note 69.
75 Id.
76 A graphic illustration of the application of this new methodology was made in a conference in
Brussels early in 1987. The example given started with a resale price in the home market of 500, and
a higher resale price by the related EEC importer of 560. The normal value was calculated by
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this method. The extent to which this method has now been sanctioned
by the Court in Ballbearings II will be addressed below.7 7
III. THE BALLBEARINGS II CASES
The Ballbearings II cases are landmark decisions.78 Five decisions
of the Court on five applications for annulment made by the Japanese
companies were handed down on May 7, 1987. These cases were the first
judgments of the Court on substantive aspects of EEC antidumping
law.7 9 Numerous procedural and substantive arguments were raised by
the applicants in support of their applications. The Court, however,
ruled against the applicants on every point. Before discussing the deci-
sions in depth, some background information is needed.
A. Administrative Procedures Since Ballbearings I
It will be recalled that in the 1979 decisions in Ballbearings I, the
Court ruled in favor of the applicants and annulled the regulation impos-
deducting "direct" selling costs in the home market (salesmen's salaries, commissions, credit, war-
ranty, packing, insurance and freight), which reduced the 500 to a normal value of 434. Starting
with an EEC resale price of 560, all direct and indirect costs of the EEC subsidiary were deducted,
plus a 5% "reasonable profit," and duties and export costs. The resulting constructed export price,
which began at 560, was 311.
On the basis of this example, it was seen that, even though the EEC related importer had a
resale price 12% higher than the home market price of its parent (only 5.5% of which was export
costs and duty), the companies would nonetheless be found dumping at the rate of 16.71%. In order
not to be found dumping, the EEC importer would have to sell at a price which is 57% higher than
the parent's selling price in the home market. This result occurs even though the selling costs in
each market are almost identical in percentage terms. The dramatic difference arises solely from the
Commission's methodology. See R. Griffith, How a Dumping Calculation is Done (remarks at the
Conference on EEC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice, Jan. 29, 1987, Brussels, Belgium).
77 See infra notes 188-223 and accompanying text.
78 The Ballbearings 11 cases consist of five appeals from Council dumping decisions: NTN Toyo
Bearing Co. v. Council, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -; Nachi Fujikoshi Corp. v. Council, 1987 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -; Koyo Seiko Co. v. Council, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -; Nippon Seiko
K.K. ("NSK") v. Council, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -; Minebea Co. v. Council, 1987 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. -. The decisions are not yet reported.
An official English translation, Judgment of the Court, is available for each case from the Court
(except for Nachi Fujikoshi, for which only a French text is available). An official translation of
Advocate General Mancini's opinion, Opinion of the Advocate General ("Op. Advocate Gen."),
which covers all five cases in Ballbearings 11, is also available from the Court. Citations to the
separate decisions are to paragraph numbers ("q") used by the Court in its translations (paragraphs
in the Opinion of the Advocate General are not numbered; the Court's page numbering is used). For
convenience, the facts of Ballbearings I1 will be referenced to the Opinion of the Advocate General
and not to the separate decisions of each case. The NSK decision is used in this Article for the legal
issues arising in all five Ballbearings H1 cases. Where legal issues unique to a particular case are
discussed, the individual decision is referenced.
79 For a discussion of the earlier cases, see supra notes 12, 19.
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ing antidumping duties on those companies.8 0 A month or so after those
judgments, the Federation of European Bearing Manufacturers Associa-
tion submitted a new complaint alleging fresh dumping practices by the
Japanese." l Following an investigation, the Commission and the Japa-
nese companies agreed to settle the investigation by an agreement on
prices.8 2  These price agreements (known as "undertakings" in EEC
practice) were embodied in the Commission decision of June 4, 1981.83
The agreements, however, were only temporary.
In March 1983, the European ballbearing industry provided infor-
mation to support allegations that additional dumping and injury were
occurring despite the price agreements. 84 In light of the expanding mar-
ket in miniature ballbearings, the allegations in the complaint, and the
Commission's own experiences in monitoring these price agreements, the
Commission decided that there was adequate evidence to justify a review
of the situation." Thus, in July 1983 the Commission announced initia-
tion of an antidumping proceeding concerning imports of certain
ballbearings originating in Japan and Singapore.8 6 After the preliminary
investigation the Commission made a provisional decision,87 revoking its
1981 acceptance of the price undertakings, and imposing provisional an-
tidumping duties on imports of those products.88 After this provisional
80 See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
81 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 10.
82 Id.
83 Commission Decision 81/406/EEC, 24 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 152) 44 (1981).
84 Ballbearings 11, Op. Advocate Gen. at 10.
85 Id
86 One of the original Japanese companies, Koyo Seiko, had a factory in Singapore, as did the
newcomer to the antidumping appeals process, Minebea. The notice of initiation was published in
26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 188) 8 (1983). The Commission later clarified that it was initiating a
review proceeding. 26 O.1. EUR. COMM. (No. C 310) 3 (1983).
87 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 79) 8 (1984)(corrigendum published in 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (NO.
L 86) 31 (1984)).
88 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 11. The provisional duties ranged from 4.36% to
18.45%. Id. Except for the normal values of Minebea in Singapore (for which constructed values
were made), normal values were established using a range of representative bearing types on the
domestic market. For the export prices, all exporters except Nachi Fujikoshi sold in the EEC
through subsidiaries. In those cases, the export price was constructed on the basis of the prices from
the subsidiaries to independent buyers, adjusted to deduct all overheads of the subsidiaries, a profit
margin of 6%, and other costs between importation and resale. Id. at 11-12. Regarding injury, the
provisional regulation found that the market shares of Japan and Singapore had increased from
17.5% to 27.9% between 1979 and 1983. The prices of the imported bearings were found lower than
the amount necessary for the EEC industry to cover its costs and earn a reasonable profit. Id. at 12
(citing 1 23 and 24 of the Preamble to the provisional regulation, Commission Regulation 744/84 of
Mar. 19, 1984). Accordingly, due to the damage to the industry, and particularly the financial losses
and unemployment, it was felt necessary to fix the level of duties at the level of the dumping margins.
Id.
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regulation was published, further meetings were held and letters sent, the
results of which were fresh offers of undertakings by the exporters. The
Commission and Council declined to accept those offers.89
Past experience had shown that undertakings in the ballbearings
sector were not a satisfactory solution to dumping, being controversial
and difficult for the Commission to monitor.9" Therefore, following a
proposal from the Commission, the Council confirmed the Commission's
findings and imposed definitive antidumping duties in Council Regula-
tion 2089/84 of July 19, 198491 ("Contested Regulation"). The duties
ranged from 4.03% to 14.71%.92
In October and November 1984, the Japanese companies filed sepa-
rate applications to annul the Contested Regulation. The applications
were filed under the second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the EEC,9 3 the usual procedure for such cases. In all five cases,
both the Commission and the European complainants were granted leave
to intervene in support of the Council.
9 4
B. Procedural Matters Decided in Ballbearings II
1. Interim Measures
In Nippon Seiko KK v. Council ("NSK") and NTN Toyo Bearing
Co. v. Council, the applicants lodged applications for the adoption of in-
terim measures (a type of relief similar to an injunction in United States
law) pursuant to Article 83 of the Court's Rules of Procedure.95 They
requested the Court to order suspension of the collection of the contested
duties pending final judgment in the main cases. The President of the
Court, however, dismissed both applications in decisions that make it
very difficult for applicants to obtain interim relief in future cases. These
orders established a balancing test for the granting of interim relief in
antidumping cases. Since the Community institutions had found injury
to the Community industry, the new balancing test requires that the in-
terests of the industry be considered. Since an interim measure cannot
prejudge the accuracy of the institutions' findings, however, the assump-
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 1 (1984)[hereinafter Contested Regulation].
92 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 5.
93 Id. at 1. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, art. 173 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
94 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 13. For citations to the five cases, see supra note 78.
95 In NSK the application was filed on December 5, 1984. In NTN Toyo the application was
filed on November 9, 1984. See Order of the President of the Court, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
4093, noted in 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 31) 3 (1985); 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 32) 8 (1985)).
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tion of the test weighs in favor of the EEC industry. This makes it very
difficult for interim relief to be granted.9 6 This new test is excessive,
97
and it is hoped that it will be revised,98 although it has already been
applied again. 99
2. Appeals of Definitive Regulations Against Both the
Council and Commission
In two of the Ballbearings II cases"° applicants instituted proceed-
ings against both the Council and Commission."'1 The regulation in
question, though proposed by the Commission, was passed by the Coun-
cil. The Commission lodged an objection to admissibility of the action
against it under Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure on the ground that
the Contested Regulation was a Council action.10 By this reasoning, the
actions against the Commission were declared inadmissible." 3 Subse-
quent cases have applied this principle in addressing annulment of Coun-
cil antidumping regulations."°
3. Admissibility of Claim to Annul Regulation in its Entirety
Four of the appeals in Ballbearings II requested that the Court an-
nul the Contested Regulation in its entirety.105 The Council objected,
96 See Order of the President of the Court, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4093.
97 The procedure for granting interim relief normally requires the applicant to prove irreparable
harm, establish a prima facie case on the merits of the application, and demonstrate urgency for the
relief. Also, the measures must not prejudge the substance of the case. See generally Borchardt, The
Award of Interim Measures by the European Court of Justice, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 203 (1985).
In addition to proof of the urgency of the matter, a prima facie case, and serious and irreparable
harm, the Court also required an analysis of the effect of the proposed measures on the EEC and
EEC industry. Order of the President of the Court, noted in 27 O.L EUR. COMM. (No. C 32) 8
(1985). The Court said suspension of payment of the duties, even though covered by the lodging of
security, would not take the Community's interests into account and would frustrate the measures
enacted. Id. It is submitted that this test is paramount to saying that interim measures are inappli-
cable to appeals of antidumping regulations.
98 See supra note 97.
99 For an example of the subsequent use of this test, see Silver Seiko Ltd. v. Council, 1985 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep.- (not yet reported), noted in 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 327) 3 (1985), where
the balancing test led the Court to dismiss the application for interim measures (and those of four
other applicants in related cases) on the ground that the EEC institutions and industry alleged such
measures could cause appreciable damage to the industry, and those interests weighed against the
damage and urgency shown by the applicant. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 327) at 7-8. This is one
of the issues on appeal in Electronic Typewriters. See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
100 Koyo Seiko, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -; Minebea, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
101 Ballbearings I1, Op. Advocate Gen. at 13.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See Tokyo Juki Indust. Co. v. Council, noted in 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 308) 4 (1986).
105 Koyo Seiko, Nachi, NSK, and NTN Toyo. See Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 13.
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maintaining that the applications were admissible only to the extent that
each challenged the portion of the Contested Regulation affecting each
particular applicant. 0 6 The Advocate General believed the Council's ob-
jection was unfounded, 0 7 stating that the Council was confusing the in-
terest of the applicants in bringing the action with the consequences of
annulment. °8  Citing Import Standard Office v. Council109 and
Timex, II as well as the applicant's reliance on FEDIOL,"' the Advocate
General believed that all the applicants had a specific interest in having
the Contested Regulation annulled, and that the consequences of the an-
nulment were a matter for the Court to decide in its final judgment.I 2
The Court, however, did not agree with the Advocate General or
the applicants. Citing Allied II,113 the Court affirmed that the appeals
were allowable to those exporters able to establish that they were identi-
fied in the measures adopted by the Commission or the Council, or were
concerned by the preliminary investigations."I4 The Court held, how-
ever, that the Contested Regulation as a whole was not applicable to each
company, and that a company was "individually concerned only by those
provisions of the Contested Regulation which impose[d] on it a specific
anti-dumping duty and determine[d] the amount thereof, and not by
those provisions which impose[d] anti-dumping duties on other under-
takings.""' Therefore, the Court upheld the objection of admissibility,
and rejected the claims for wholesale annulment.'
6
4. Refusal to Accept Price Undertakings or Take Account of
Unilateral Price Increases
The Japanese companies also argued in their applications that the
Commission and Council had unlawfully failed to consider the price un-
dertakings offered by the parties or the fact that some of the companies
106 Id.
107 Id. at 14.
108 Id.
109 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1277, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8575 (1979).
110 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 849, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1
14,143.
111 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2913, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) T
14,013.
112 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 14.
113 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,200.
114 NSK, Judgment of the Court 1 6 (Ballbearings II). For ease of reference, most citations on
common issues hereinafter will be to NSK, since the other judgments substantially follow NSK on
the main issues.
I I Id.
116 NSK, Judgment of the Court 7 (Ballbearings 1I).
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had increased their prices during and after the investigation period. The
Advocate General and the Court concluded that the refusal to accept the
price undertakings (offered after the provisional duties were imposed by
Regulation 744/84) was not unlawful.1 17 Citing FEDIOL, 118 the Advo-
cate General concluded that, due to the very wide discretion of the Com-
mission to select the most appropriate measures for a given situation, it
was for the Commission alone to decide whether an undertaking would
adequately safeguard the Community interests.' 19 After examining the
provisions of the Antidumping Regulation, 120 the Court concluded that
there was no provision requiring the EEC institutions to accept price
undertakings offered to them; Article 10 was held to have clearly granted
discretion as to acceptance of undertakings.' 2 '
As for the institutions' failure to take account of price increases, the
Advocate General and the Court again found that no error had been
made. The Advocate General found nothing in the Antidumping Regu-
lation that required exporters' price increases to be taken into account'
after the investigation period.'22 The Court agreed, adding that it was
essential for the investigation period to be of a "specified and limited
duration," so that investigations may be completed in a reasonable
117 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 25.
118 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2913, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1
14,013.
119 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 25.
120 The Antidumping Regulation, supra note 24, was still in force when the Contested Regula-
tion, supra note 91, was ordered. Article 10(1) and (2) of the Antidumping Regulation provides as
follows:
1. Where, during the course of a proceeding, undertakings are offered which the Commission
after consultation considers acceptable, anti-dumping/anti-subsidy proceedings may be termi-
nated without the imposition of provisional or definitive duties. Such termination shall be de-
cided in conformity with the procedure laid down in Article 9(1) and information shall be given
and notice published in accordance with Article 9(2). Such termination does not preclude the
definitive collection of amounts secured by way of provisional duties pursuant to Article 12(2).
2. The undertakings referred to under paragraph 1 are those under which: (a) the subsidy is
eliminated or limited, or other measures concerning its injurious effects taken, by the govern-
ment of the country of origin or export; or (b) prices are revised or exports cease to the extent
that the Commission is satisfied that either the dumping margin or the amount of the subsidy,
or the injurious effects thereof, are eliminated. In case of subsidization the consent of the coun-
try of origin or export shall be obtained.
121 NSK, Judgment of the Court % 51 (Ballbearings II ). Despite the institutions' discretion in
accepting undertakings, this has been their preferred means of resolving cases, although recently
their use has decreased somewhat. The Commission had described its policy as follows: "the Com-
munity is impartial in its stance on the acceptance of price undertakings as an alternative to the
imposition of duties. Indeed, it is often found that undertakings prove to be more flexible than duties
as a means of eliminating the injury caused by dumping or subsidization." First Annual Report on
the Community's Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Activities, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITY 9-1983, point
2.2.2 (1983). See also I. VAN BAEL & J. BELLIS, supra note 45, at 98-99.
122 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 26.
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time. 123
5. Adequacy of the Statement of Reasons for Assessing Duty Rate
Relying upon Allied 11,124 several applicants argued that the EEC
institutions had failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons for the
level of duties assessed. In the Contested Regulation the Council had
applied duties at the level of the dumping margin definitively established
by the Commission. The Contested Regulation expressly referred to the
injury findings of the provisional ruling, Regulation 744/84, where the
Commission found material injury and concluded that the provisional
duty should correspond to the dumping margin. It also noted that, since
this earlier regulation was issued, the applicants had not submitted any
fresh evidence concerning injury to the Community industry.
The Court in NSK found that the Council's express reference to the
Commission's earlier findings was, in these circumstances, an adequate
statement of reasons. 125 Since there was a statement that the Council
confirmed the earlier findings on injury and that no new evidence had
been presented, the Court felt that it could be "implied that the definitive
duty would, like the provisional duty, be fixed at a rate corresponding to
the dumping margin." 126 Accordingly, the Court found that the Con-
tested Regulation had given an adequate statement of reasons relating to
the extent of injury and the level of duty required to remove it.127
The NSK ruling by the Court must be seen as a significant limitation
on its ruling in Allied 11.12 Allied II required the Council to make ex-
press findings, but in NSK the Court stated that such findings may be
"implied." The Contested Regulation in Ballbearings II contained no
more than a pro forma reference to the Commission's basic findings, and
it contained nothing expressly indicating that the Council itself had de-
cided the amount of duty necessary.12 9 This is an unfortunate step back-
ward by the Court. In such matters as the setting of levels of duties-the
differences of which can amount to millions of dollars in some cases-
123 NSK, Judgment of the Court % 52 (Ballbearings 1I ). The Court also noted that price in-
creases may be possible grounds for a review proceeding pursuant to Article 14 of the Antidumping
Regulation, supra note 24, or refunds under Article 15, but the initial procedures should not be
influenced or delayed by such increases. NSK, Judgment of the Court 53 (Ballbearings H).
124 Allied 11, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,200.
125 NSK, Judgment of the Court 1 56 (Ballbearings HI).
126 Id. 57 (emphasis added).
127 Id. 59.
128 See Allied 11, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,200; see also notes supra 18, 41-45 and
accompanying text.
129 The Contested Regulation, supra note 9I, was enacted before the judgment in Allied 11, so the
Council did not take it into account when drafting its regulations.
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one would expect that due process and substantial justice would require
more of the Community institutions by way of explanation, and judicial
review of their actions. It can only be hoped that this ruling is a slight
aberration of the earlier trend towards reasonable procedural rights and
responsibilities.
6. Absence of Company's Name from a Complaint
In Ballbearings II, one of the appellants, Koyo Seiko, contended
that the procedure against it was unwarranted since, although it had par-
ticipated in the administrative proceedings, it was not mentioned further
in the case apart from its name's appearance on the cover of the com-
plaint. 3 ' The Court noted, however, that the procedure at issue was a
review of the undertakings authorized under Article 14 of the Antidump-
ing Regulation. Since the Commission may itself take the initiative
under Article 14, the Court found that Koyo Seiko's absence from the
body of the complaint did not constitute an obstacle to the opening of
this procedure against it."13
C. Substantive Matters Decided in Ballbearings II
In the judgments of the Court, several important substantive issues
were also discussed. The principle issues can be generally categorized
into two types: first, the use of different methodologies to determine nor-
mal values and export prices; and second, the failure to make adequate
adjustments to the normal values and the export prices. The Court's
analysis of these issues was not as clearcut as the categories indicate, but
such divisions are helpful in understanding the Court's rulings.
L The Use of Different Methodologies to Determine
Normal Values and Export Prices
The five different applications under Ballbearings 11 sprouted several
procedural and substantive arguments in the first general category of is-
sues. The principal argument was that the applicants' dumping margins
were calculated incorrectly through the use of an unprecedented new
methodology. The arguments were: 1) use of a new method combining
weighted averages to determine normal values while using the transac-
tion-by-transaction method to determine export prices was unlawful and
130 Koyo Seiko, Judgment of the Court % 9 (Ballbearings I1 ).
131 Id. The Contested Regulation had a very unusual procedural history. See supra notes 84-94
and accompanying text. While the Court's analysis of this issue was not entirely satisfactory, the
conclusion was correct in the overall context of the Antidumping Regulation, supra note 24, and
EEC practice.
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inequitable; 2) the statement of reasons for choosing this new method
was inadequate; 3) the new method was adopted in breach of the princi-
ples of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, and sound administration;
4) prices of different products were compared though not actually com-
parable; and 5) normal values and export prices were not computed on a
comparable basis. 132 Each of these arguments is discussed below.
a. Mixed use of weighted and transaction-by-transaction methods
In the Contested Regulation normal values were calculated for cer-
tain representative models on the basis of a weighted average of the
prices paid on the domestic market; 133 export prices were computed on
an individual, transaction-by-transaction basis. 134 After calculating these
individual export prices and making the necessary deductions to bring
them to ex-factory prices, any export prices that were above their compa-
rable normal value (i.e., where dumping was not indicated) were then
reduced artificially to the level of their normal value. The dumping
margin was then determined by comparing the weighted average normal
values and the individual export prices, including those reduced
artificially. 135
In many respects, the applicants' principal complaint concerned the
artificial reduction of those export prices which were above normal value.
In all of the applicants' prior dealings with the Commission, weighted
averages had been used for both normal value and export price. They
asserted that the new method was incorrect because it excluded the large
number of export sales made at non-dumping prices. 136 This method
tends to show a dumping margin even where the average export prices
are not different from domestic market prices. The eventual antidump-
ing duties are thus higher, and are then applied unfairly to dumped and
non-dumped sales alike. According to the applicants, the new method
was not only inequitable but also unlawful. 137  The applicants argued
that the relevant portion of the Antidumping Regulation allowed a
choice between methods, but not combinations of methods. 138 The Com-
munity institutions denied that the Antidumping Regulation contained
132 See Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 17-18; NSK, Judgment of the Court $ 9 (Ballbear-
ings 1 ).
133 NSK, Judgment of the Court 12 (Ballbearings II )(referring to 11 of the Preamble to the
Contested Regulation, supra note 91).
134 Id. (referring to T 16 of the Preamble to the Contested Regulation, supra note 91).
135 Id.
136 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 19.
137 NSK, Judgment of the Court 13 (Ballbearings II).
138 Id.
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any prohibition on combining the methods listed.
1 39
The Advocate General echoed the EEC institutions' arguments.
140
Despite the disjunctive sense of the applicable provision-"the dumping
margin may be established on a transaction-by-transaction basis or by
reference to the most frequently occurring, representative or weighted
average prices"' 14 1-the Advocate General saw simply a listing of possi-
ble methods, having neither an order of precedence nor criteria for pre-
ferring one to another. 42 Further, he saw nothing inequitable about
leaving the full value of export prices above normal value out of the com-
putation.1 43  Based upon his own hypothetical example, the Advocate
General assumed that "to offset against one another prices in excess of
the normal value and prices below the normal value would mathemati-
cally cancel out any dumping margin.. . ." " Flowing from this faulty
stream of logic, the Advocate General then concluded that Article 4(2),
concerning the injury analysis of the volume and prices of dumped im-
ports, required that dumping margins "take into account only the volume
of imports made at dumping prices . "..."145 In the end, his view was
that the Commission's practice was more favorable to exporters than the
Antidumping Regulation seemed to have required.
Like the Advocate General, the Court failed to tackle the issue of
139 Id. Article 2(13)(b) of the Antidumping Regulation provided that, "[w]here prices vary, the
dumping margin may be established on a transaction-by-transaction basis or by reference to the
most frequently occurring, representative or weighted average prices." Antidumping Regulation,
supra note 24 (emphasis added). The applicants felt the disjunctive sense of the provision supported
their position.
140 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 19 (referring to the institutions and citing Article
2(13)(c) of the Antidumping Regulation, supra note 24, which provided that "[w]here dumping
margins vary, weighted averages may be established").
141 Id. (emphasis added).
142 Id. at 8. His conclusion was correct that there are no preferences stated, but missed the point
of the applicants' arguments: that the Antidumping Regulation did not permit mixing of methods.
The Antidumping Regulation listed methods, but the word "or" indicated that a choice among the
methods was required, though it did not instruct the EEC institutions as to how or in what order the
choice should be made. See supra note 139.
143 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 21.
144 Id. Obviously this assumption is not true in many cases, as is demonstrated by the fact that
numerous dumping margins have been established by using those same methods.
145 Id. (emphasis added). If this conclusion were true, then weighted averages could never law-
fully be used. However, the Antidumping Regulation, supra note 24, provides them as alternatives,
showing that the Advocate General's views are not consistent with the text of the Antidumping
Regulation. In his excellent survey of EEC practice, Davey criticizes the Commission's method of
ignoring instances where the export price exceeds the normal value: "The fairness of this practice is
not immediately obvious. If an exporter's prices on the average exceed normal value, how can it be
argued that Community industry is hurt? ... There may be some latitude to argue that no injury has
been incurred if significant negative dumping margins are in fact present." Davey, supra note 57, at
67-68.
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statutory construction raised by the applicants. Rather, the Court stated
that "the choice between the different methods of calculation specified in
Article 2(13)(b) of [the Antidumping Regulation] requires an appraisal
of complex economic situations." '146 Based on the holding of Remia v.
Commission,147 cited by the Advocate General, the Court concluded in
NSK 148 that it must "[limit its review of such an appraisal to verifying
whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether
the facts on which the choice is based have been accurately stated and
whether there has been a manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of pow-
ers." '149 The Court found that the applicants' arguments were tanta-
mount to alleging a manifest error of appraisal in choosing a method
which does not take full account of export prices above normal value. 150
The Court then rejected these arguments, finding that the artificial reduc-
tion of export prices meant that the transaction-by-transaction method
did not exclude them from the calculation and that the Commission had
the freedom to choose the method it deemed most appropriate.'51 The
Court repeated the Advocate General's theory that the injury suffered by
the Community industry, arising from "certain manoeuvres in which
dumping is disguised by charging different prices," '152 could only be han-
dled by using the transaction-by-transaction method.' 53 The Court
therefore found that the Commission had not committed any manifest
errors in its appraisal of the choice of methods, and the applicants' sub-
mission on this point was rejected.
154
It is unfortunate that the Court has chosen, when faced with "com-
plex economic situations," to retreat to such a limited scope of general
judicial review. Given the fact that the Court is currently the only ave-
nue of review of the Commission's and Council's decision, a higher stan-
dard and level of review is necessary. In these cases, the Commission
acts as police officer, investigator, and judge, having broad discretionary
powers. In order to follow the practices of its other GATT partners, a
146 NSK, Judgment of the Court 1 21 (Ballbearings I).
147 [1987] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 1 (1985).
148 NSK, Judgment of the Court 1 21 (Ballbearings 1I).
149 Id. It should be seen here that the Court also is avoiding or neglecting the important issue of
statutory construction raised by the applicants. See supra notes 139, 142.
150 NSK, Judgment of the Court 1 22 (Ballbearings I ). The Court does not address the alleged
manifest error of law. See supra note 149.
151 NSK, Judgment of the Court 1 23 (Ballbearings II).
152 Id. 25. The allegation of "disguised" dumping was not raised by the Commission or Coun-
cil, so it is unclear why the Court attributed such motives or actions to the applicants.
153 Id. 1 26. For comments on these arguments, see supra notes 142, 144-45.
154 NSK, Judgment of the Court 1 26 (Ballbearings 11 ). An unofficial expression of the Commis-
sion's views on these general issues can be found in J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at
112-15.
EEC Antidumping Law and Policy
8:365(1987)
reasonable judicial (or even administrative) review of the record would
seem to be a minimal requirement.
b. Inadequate statement of reasons for choosing the
new method of calculation
Article 190 of the EEC Treaty15 requires a statement of reasons
that discloses in a clear and unequivocal fashion the reasoning followed
by an EEC institution, a principle which the Court had affirmed in
Nicolet Instrument v. Hauptzollamt Frankfurt-am-Main.156 This state-
ment of reasons is required so concerned parties are aware of the reasons
for such measures (and can thus defend their rights) and so the Court
can exercise its supervisory function.'
5 7
Several applicants argued that the reasons set out in paragraph 18 of
the Contested Regulation'58 were inadequate, since it was not explained
why the Commission had changed from the weighted average basis used
previously to the new methods.'59 The Court found the statement
therein to be adequate, however, stating that it was clear that the change
of method was made in order to eliminate injury which allegedly had
subsisted under the previous method of calculation, allowing dumping to
be offset by "negative" dumping. 6 ° For this reason, the Court rejected
the applicants' arguments.
1 61
c. Breach of the principles of legitimate expectation,
legal certainty, and sound administration
Several applicants claimed that the adoption of the new method,
which mixed the use of weighted averages for normal value with the
transaction-by-transaction method for export price, violated the princi-
ples of legal certainty and legitimate expectation, and breached the rules
155 EEC Treaty, supra note 93.
156 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. - (not yet reported), cited in NSK, Judgment of the Court 1 28
(Ballbearings fl). NSK cited for the same proposition the decision in Groupement des Fabricants de
Papiers Peints de Belgique v. Comm'n, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1491, but the Court did not refer
to it in its decision.
157 Nicolet, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at -, cf Timex, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 849 (regula-
tion annulled due to Commission's failure to disclose sufficient information to complainants); Allied
11, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,200 (regulation annulled due to absence in the record of
information as to whether the Council had met its duty to assess the necessary level of duties).
158 See 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 1, 3 (1984).
159 See, e-g., NSK, Judgment of the Court 29 (Ballbearings II).
160 Id. This is a curious conclusion, since the Contested Regulation does not mention injury in
1118. However, it does give a fairly reasonable explanation of the reasons, so the Court's conclusion
is probably not incorrect; only its reasoning is suspect.
161 Id. 30.
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of sound administration. 162 Those principles and rules would have re-
quired that adequate advance notice be given so that the parties could
modify their trading practices to comply with the new requirements of
the Community.16 3 The Court disagreed. First, it recalled that Ballbear-
ings II was a review proceeding under Article 14 of the Antidumping
Regulation, which provided that such undertakings may be amended, re-
pealed, or annulled.' 64 Thus, the Court decided that the principle of
legal certainty did not prevent the re-examination of the earlier
measures. 165
Secondly, as to the principle of legitimate expectation, the Court re-
called that Article 2(13)(b) of the Antidumping Regulation gave the EEC
institutions the option to choose their methods.166 Citing Faust v. Com-
mission,167 the Court stated that, "where the institutions enjoy a margin
of discretion in the choice of means necessary to achieve their policies,
traders cannot claim to have a legitimate expectation that the means
originally chosen will be maintained, since these may be altered by the
institutions in the exercise of their powers." 168
Thirdly, the Court stated that "the rules of sound administration
cannot prevent the institutions from using the powers conferred upon
them by the regulations in force." 169 Having decided against the appli-
cants on these three points, the Court rejected the applicants'
submissions.
170
d. Comparison of non-comparable products
A point advanced only by the applicants in Minebea Co. v. EEC 17 1
concerned differences in physical characteristics of a model between the
162 See, e.g., NSK, Judgment of the Court 29 (Ballbearings 1I ).
163 Id. The Court in NSK, for example, had argued that legitimate expectations may be created
without any express promise or assurance having been given by the Commission, citing CNTA, 1975
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 533, 549. The applicants argued further that due to existing price undertak-
ings, they had a legitimate expectation that the Commission would continue to apply the same meth-
ods until those undertakings were withdrawn, citing Rumi v. Comm'n, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
487, 11. The Court did not refer to the cited cases in its judgment.
164 NSK, Judgment of the Court 32 (Ballbearings II).
165 Id. 31.
166 Id. 33. For the text of the provision, see supra note 139.
167 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3745, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8878 (1982).
168 NSK, Judgment of the Court 34 (Ballbearings 1).
169 Id. $ 35.
170 Id. In this respect, the Court concurred with the Advocate General's views, which also relied
on Faust. See Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 16-17.
171 Judgment of the Court 1 30 (Ballbearings 11 ).
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domestic and export markets. 172 In Minebea, there were some technical
differences between the models, the extent of which was not agreed upon
by Minebea and the Commission. Minebea claimed that the two types of
bearings were not comparable, thus violating the principle of Article 2(9)
and (10) of the Antidumping Regulation, and distorting the compari-
son. 173 The details of this factual dispute were unclear.1 74  However,
under Article 2(10) the burden of claiming an allowance for any differ-
ences is upon the party making the claim, and since no proof from
Minebea had been forthcoming, Minebea's submission was rejected.
175
e. Computation of normal values and export prices on a
non-comparable basis
In NSK, the applicant argued that there was a connection between
Article 2(13) and Article 2(9) of the Antidumping Regulation. Its theory
was that the choice of methods under Article 2(13) must be consistent
with the principle of Article 2(9), requiring a fair comparison.1 76 Be-
cause different methods were used for computing the normal value and
the export price, in the applicant's view those methods were inconsistent
with Article 2(9).
The Article 2(9) argument is an extremely important issue in EEC
antidumping law. As is noted further below, it seems that neither the
Advocate General nor the judges of the Court fully appreciated its com-
plexities. Unfortunately, the presentation of these arguments to the
Court in the parties' written pleadings also was unclear. 177 The resulting
judgment on this issue is somewhat confusing, but nonetheless is also
discussed below.
1 78
The Court noted, in response to the applicants' submissions under
172 Where physical differences exist between the product sold in the domestic market and in the
EEC, an adjustment to account for differences in price comparability may be given. Antidumping
Regulation, supra note 24, art. 2(9)-(10)(a).
173 See supra note 172.
174 Ballbearings 11, Op. Advocate Gen. at 24. It is unclear whether Minebea claimed that the
bearings were not comparable at all, or whether they could have been made comparable by adjust-
ments but that those adjustments had not been made or were insufficient. If its point was the former,
it appears that Minebea conceded at least some aspect of the technical issue at its oral hearing. See
id. If it was the latter point, it seems that the Council had made certain adjustments but no further
proof had been submitted by Minebea. Minebea, Judgment of the Court 30 (Ballbearings 11).
175 Minebea, Judgment of the Court 1 33-34 (Ballbearings 1I).
176 NSK, Judgment of the Court 1 13 (Ballbearings 11 ).
177 This is generally admitted by the parties involved. Indeed, at the oral arguments for these
cases the Court was frankly encouraged to read the pleadings submitted in a later series of cases,
Electronic Typewriters, infra note 224, where the treatment of the issues was said to be much more
thorough, systematic, and well presented by both sides.
178 See infra notes 188-223 and accompanying text.
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Article 2(9), that the provisions for determining normal value are set
forth in the Antidumping Regulation, Article 2, paragraphs 3 to 7, and
the provisions for determining export price are in Article 2(8). Each of
those provisions separately specifies several different methods for calcu-
lating the two items.17 9 The Court found that the provisions of Article
2(13)(b) and (c) of the Antidumping Regulation confirmed the fact that
these various methods of calculation of normal value and export price are
independent, since the provisions "merely state the various possibilities
for calculating the dumping margin without imposing any requirement
that the methods chosen for calculating the normal value and the export
price should be similar or identical." '
Secondly, the Court examined Article 2(9) itself,181 and made two
points concerning it. First, Article 2(9) was found to be intended to de-
fine the adjustments to be made to normal value and export price as de-
termined by Article 2, paragraphs 3 to 7 and paragraph 8, respect-
ively.182 Second, the Court found those adjustments related exclusively
to several differences in the domestic and export markets: 1) physical
characteristics; 2) quantities of the products; 3) the conditions and terms
of sale; and 4) the level of trade.183 Accordingly, the Court concluded
"that Article 2(9) of the regulation [did] not require the normal value
and the export price to be calculated according to the same method."
1 84
In its rejection of the applicants' submission, 185 the Court seems to
have concluded that there is nothing in the Antidumping Regulation
which requires that the same method be used to compute normal value
and export price. Within the parameters of the arguments presented by
the applicants, the Court may have been technically correct, but missed
the real point. The provisions of Article 2(9) and (10) do require that the
export price and normal value be on a "comparable basis" in order for
there to be a "fair comparison." '86 It is granted that Article 2(9) and
(10) do not discuss the calculation methods for normal value and export
price. If the methods used to calculate normal value and export price,
179 NSK, Judgment of the Court 14 (Ballbearings 1I ).
180 Id. 15. For the text of Article 2(13)(b-c), see supra notes 139-140.
181 For the purposes of a fair comparison, the export price and the normal value shall be on a
comparable basis as regards physical characteristics of the product, quantities, and conditions
and terms of sale. They shall normally be compared at the same level of trade, preferably at the
ex-factory level, and as nearly as possible at the same time.
Antidumping Regulation, supra note 24, Article 2(9).




186 See supra note 181.
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however, result in their not being on a "comparable basis" (and the speci-
fied allowances are still inadequate to put them on a comparable basis),
then those methods do not lead to a "fair comparison" and are inconsis-
tent with the Antidumping Regulation and GATT.
187
2. Symmetry of Normal Value and Export Price for a
Fair Comparison
This controversial issue concerned the failure of the Commission to
make necessary adjustments to put normal value and export sales price
on a comparable basis in order to allow a fair comparison. This con-
cept-sometimes called "symmetry"-is well-known to trade law spe-
cialists in the United States.188 It involves the problem of making
appropriate allowances in normal value and export price where there are
sales through subsidiary companies. There has been a great deal of de-
bate in the United States on this subject, including such important court
cases as Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed
America'19 ("SCM IP'), Silver Reed America v. United States, °90 and
Smith-Corona Group, Consumer Products Division v. United States 91
("SCM I"), and a long history of hearings, amendments to the laws and
regulations, and varied interpretations of the rules, the general result of
which has been to recognize and uphold the need for these adjustments
to ensure a fair and equitable comparison.
192
In the judicial and expert analyses of the United States legislation
(which is based on the same GATT provisions as the EEC regulation)
there has been a clear overview of the purposes of the legislation: "One of
the goals of the statute is to guarantee that the administering authority
187 For further discussions on these issues, see infra notes 188-92, 200-04, 213-15 and accompany-
ing text.
188 In the United States, the discussion has centered on the "ESP offset" and the circumstances of
sales adjustments. See, eg., Victor & Ehrgood, Circumstances of Sales Adjustments in Anti-Dumping
Investigations: A Reevaluation, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY, supra note 1, at 7-1; Holmer &
Bello, Import Law and Policy Series: Fair "Apples to Apples" Comparisons in Dumping Cases, 19
INT'L LAW. 927 (1985); 1984 Trade Law Survey, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 473, 564-66 (1985).
189 Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed America, Inc. ("SCMII"), 753 F.2d
1033, 1039-40 (Fed. Cir. 1985)(upholding the ESP offset "cap" as being a reasonable limitation in
light of the agency's expert evaluation of the need for fair comparison).
190 581 F. Supp. 1290, 1294 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984)(confirming the fundamental statutory objective
of achieving a fair comparison of "apples with apples"), rev'd on other grounds, SCM II, 753 F.2d
1033.
191 Smith Corona Group, Consumer Products Div., SCM Corp. v. United States ("SCM F'), 713
F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1274 (1984)(upholding the ESP offset system of
deducting indirect home market selling expenses).
192 The administrative regulation involved is 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c). For a brief review of the
history of the provision and the ESP offset, see supra note 188.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:365(1987)
makes the fair value [normal value] comparison on a fair basis-compar-
ing apples with apples."' 93 In wording that evokes the same arguments
made by the applicants in Ballbearings II in favor of an adjustment to
offset the imbalanced methodologies, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit saw the need for the offset as an expression of the
requirement of a fair comparison. The Court in SCM I explained:
Were it not for the exporter's sales price offset, comparisons based on
purchase price would be fair, yet comparisons based on exporter's sales
price would be skewed in favor of a higher dumping margin. We do not
believe that the statute requires the Secretary to compare both apples and
oranges with only apples. Rather, it expressly requires a fair comparison.
The offset is an attempt to achieve such a comparison.
194
Unfortunately, as will be seen below, the EEC Court and institutions
have not had the same clarity of overview, nor the same desire to see
fairness accomplished, as have the United States commentators and
courts.
In the EEC, there is a much shorter history. Indeed, until the Com-
mission began its aggressive series of new interpretations of the An-
tidumping Regulation-which commenced with the Ballbearings II
cases-this issue really had not fully arisen in EEC practice.195 When
the Contested Regulation was enacted by the Council in mid-1984, this
was the first occasion in which the Commission and Council applied the
new methodology.
In the Contested Regulation, most of the applicants' export prices
were determined on the basis of the sales prices of their EEC subsidiar-
ies, "'96 a method that is provided for in Article 2(8) of the Antidumping
Regulation. From the subsidiaries' resale prices, all of the direct and
indirect selling and overhead costs and a "reasonable profit" were de-
ducted. Thus, after deductions for such items as freight, insurance, du-
ties and like expenses, the export prices were on an ex-factory basis.1
97
For normal values, a much different methodology was followed.
Prices in the domestic market to the first independent customer were
used. Where the companies had domestic selling subsidiaries, however,
193 SCM I, 713 F.2d at 1578.
194 Id. (emphasis added). The analogy of apples and oranges refers to the need for the normal or
fair value and the export price to have the same essential character-i.e., to be truly and fairly
comparable.
195 For a brief introduction to these issues, see supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
196 The Contested Regulation does not mention the method used, see 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
193) 1 (1984), but it is clear that the calculation was done in this way. See, e.g., NSK, Judgment of
the Court q 38 (Ballbearings 1I ).
197 Ballbearings 11, Op. Advocate Gen. at 22-23.
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the price used was that of the domestic subsidiary. 198 As the applicants
in most cases sold in Japan through distribution companies that were not
operating from a factory, those sales prices were not ex-factory prices,
and differences existed between those prices and the export prices. Thus,
while all expenses of the European subsidiaries had been deducted, only
some of the corresponding costs incurred on the domestic market were
deducted from the normal values.1 9 9
The applicants claimed that the disparity in treatment created an
artificially high normal value which, when coupled with the more sub-
stantial deductions for export price, led to an artificially high dumping
margin. In their view, this was unjustified since sales in both markets
had been at the same level of distribution, but the methodologies used
made the two values uncomparable.2 °° The applicants argued that Arti-
cle 2(9) of the Antidumping Regulation requires that the export price
and normal value be handled on a symmetrical basis so that two prices
beginning on the same level of distribution are treated on a "comparable
basis."2 01
In his opinion in Ballbearings II, Advocate General Mancini re-
jected those arguments entirely. He stated flatly: "That argument may
have its attractions but it is untenable because the system disregards in
principle and excludes in practice the symmetry relied upon by [the ap-
plicants]. 2 2 The Advocate General noted that the deductions of export
sales expenses were mandated by Article 2(8)(b), whereas the deductions
on the normal value side desired by the applicants could be done only for
purposes of comparison of the two sides.20 3
In the Advocate General's view, such deductions on the normal
value side were 'prohibited-and this is the point-by the provision in
Article 2(10)(c) governing 'comparative' allowances. '204  Since his view
198 The use of the subsidiaries' resale price was not challenged in Ballbearings II. The legality of
this method under Article 2(3) and (7) of the Antidumping Regulation, supra note 24, has been
challenged in subsequent appeals against the regulations in the Electronic Typewriters and Japanese
Photocopiers appeals. See infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
199 NSK, Judgment of the Court % 38 (Ballbearings II).
200 Id. 37.
201 Id. This is broadly the same argument as the United States court in SCMI found so persua-
sive. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
202 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 23. His conclusions are strikingly different from those
expressed in SCM I, 713 F.2d 1568. See supra notes 191, 193-94 and accompanying text.
203 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 23.
204 Id. (emphasis added). This provision provides:
If the export price and the normal value are not on a comparable basis in respect of the
factors mentioned in paragraph 9, due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for
differences affecting price comparability. Where an interested party claims such an allowance,
it must prove that its claim is justified.
The following guidelines shall apply in determining these allowances:
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(incorrect, as shown below) gave such allowances only for expenses bear-
ing a direct relationship to the sales,205 he concluded that the allowances
"cannot possibly include the costs incurred by the subsidiaries . . . in
marketing the product on the domestic market. 20 6 To the Advocate
General, it did not matter whether the marketing on the domestic market
was done by a sales department of the producer or by a related sales
company; the costs were both a part of the company's overhead and thus
were not deductible.20 7 In addition, the Advocate General argued that
sales expenses had to be taken into account in computing constructed
values under the Antidumping Regulation, and that it would "be unrea-
sonable if the legislature allowed those expenses to be deducted immedi-
ately thereafter by making comparative allowances.
20 8
As a final point, the Advocate General addressed specific cost ad-
justments requested by NSK. While those costs (communications, tech-
nical assistance, and freight) were in principle deductible, he felt NSK
had not submitted adequate proof for the costs as required by the An-
tidumping Regulation.20 9
(c) differences in conditions and terms of sale: allowances shall be limited, in general, to
those differences which bear a direct relationship to the sales under consideration and in-
clude, for example, differences in duties and indirect taxation, credit terms, guarantees,
warranties, technical assistance, servicing, commissions or salaries paid to salesmen, pack-
ing, transport, insurance, handling, loading and ancillary costs; allowances generally will
not be made for differences in overheads and general expenses, including research and
development costs, or advertising; the amount of these allowances shall normally be deter-
mined by the cost of such differences to the seller, though consideration may also be given
to their effect on the value of the product;
Antidumping Regulation, supra note 24, art. 2(10)(c)(emphasis added).
205 Note that the Antidumping Regulation, supra note 24, does not say "only," but rather "gener-
ally." See supra note 204. However, the Advocate General's error was not completely understood
by the Court. See infra notes 214, 222-23 and accompanying text.
206 Ballbearings I1, Op. Advocate Gen. at 23.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 24. Actually, the legislature has provided for selling expenses to be deducted immedi-
ately after computing constructed values. Here, the Advocate General (perhaps understandably)
reflects his lack of experience with EEC antidumping practice. In that practice, the Commission
computes constructed values by including an amount of general, administrative, and sales expenses.
This is the normal value. However, where warranted, the Commission then makes deductions for
direct selling expenses (or other relevant adjustments) as provided under the Antidumping Regula-
tion, supra note 24, art. 2(10)(c). Thus, from the practical side, the Antidumping Regulation's men-
tion of selling expenses as an element in constructed values is not relevant to his argument. The
Advocate General was mistaken because selling expenses are deducted when constructed values are
adjusted under Article 2(9) and (10).
Theoretically, the Advocate General's argument here is inconsistent with his earlier argument,
where he had distinguished between the methods for computing normal value and export price
under Article 2(3)-(8) and the adjustments under Article 2(9) and (10). See supra notes 200-01 and
accompanying text. His argument here, however, fails to distinguish the difference between the
selling expenses in Article 2(3) and the adjustments under Article 2(9) and (10).
209 Ballbearings II, Op. Advocate Gen. at 24.
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The Advocate General made several key errors in his opinion. First,
he erroneously read Article 2(10)(c) to allow only direct costs, whereas
the Article 2(10) "guidelines" speak only of general limitations.21 0 Sec-
ond, his argument against symmetry (which distinguishes between the
methods for setting normal value and export price as compared to the
Article 2(9) adjustments for comparison) was inconsistent with his argu-
ment against granting adjustments for domestic sales expenses, in which
he failed to account for those methodological distinctions.2" Third, he
incorrectly concluded that the granting of allowances to take account of
cost differences like those requested by the applicants would be tanta-
mount to reducing both sides to the cost of production plus overhead,
thus removing the possibility of finding a dumping margin. 2  This argu-
ment incorrectly concludes that dumping is a form of price discrimina-
tion, and also disregards the fact that other GATT partners (such as the
United States) have granted such adjustments in like situations and still
found dumping margins.213 Thus, the Advocate General's opinion can-
not be regarded as a correct legal analysis of the issues at hand. The
Court's analysis, though reaching the same basic final conclusions as the
Advocate General, used an analysis which did not torture logic or the
Regulation nearly as much.214 Still, since the pleadings of the parties
were not entirely satisfactory,2" 5 and since the Advocate General's opin-
ion was not particularly well reasoned, it is not altogether surprising that
the Court's opinion is less than satisfactory.
As its starting point, the Court noted that Article 2(8)(b) requires
that all of the expenses of an EEC sales subsidiary should be deducted to
arrive at an ex-factory price.2 16 Where the export price and normal value
are not comparable as set forth in Article 2(9), allowance ought to be
made, stressed the Court, drawing particular attention to differences in
conditions and terms of sale under Article 2(1O)(c).
217
The Court further distinguished between the allowances made to
210 See supra notes 204-05. This error is also found in the general analysis of his opinion. See
Ballbearings 1I, Op. Advocate Gen. at 6-8.
211 What the Advocate General said would be "unreasonable" for the legislature to do is actually
the standard practice. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
212 Ballbearings 11, Op. Advocate Gen. at 7.
213 See supra notes 188-94 and accompanying text.
214 For example, whereas the Advocate General deleted the words "in general" from his quota-
tion of Article202(10)(c) of the Antidumping Regulation, thereby contradicting his previous inter-
pretation of "only" direct expenses being deductible in the comparison, the Court quoted the full
text and recognized the implications of those words. Compare Ballbearings 11, Op. Advocate Gen.
at 7, with NSK, Judgment of the Court 41 (Ballbearings 11).
215 See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
216 NSK, Judgment of the Court 39 (Ballbearings 1).
217 Id. 1 41.
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construct export price and the allowances made under Article 2(10)(c).
The 2(10)(c) allowances are intended to rectify export prices or normal
values already calculated.21 s In addition, the 2(10)(c) adjustments must
be claimed and justified, whereas the export price allowances under Arti-
cle 2(8) are automatic. 219  To claim an Article 2(10) adjustment, the
Court found that:
[a] party making such a claim'must prove that its claim is justified, that is to
say that the difference on which it relies concerns one of the factors listed
by Article 2(9), that the difference affects price comparability and lastly, if,
as in this case, it is a question particularly of differences in conditions and
terms of sale, that those differences bear a direct relationship to the sales
under consideration.22°
The Court held that none of the three applicants which had raised
this issue had succeeded in showing that its claim for adjustments had
satisfied these conditions.221  The expression of the Court's conclusion
was stated most clearly in the NSK decision:
As regards the allowances in respect of the cost of telephone communica-
tions, customer services and technical services, NSK has not established
that those differences bore a direct relationship to the sales under considera-
tion. Although it is true that Article 2(10)(c) provides that allowances shall
only "in general" be limited to differences which bear a direct relationship
to sales, NSK has not established the existence of any special circumstance
capable of justifying an exception to that general rule.222
As can be seen from these decisions, Ballbearings II has established
two principles with which to interpret the provisions of Article 2(10)(c)
concerning adjustments in conditions and terms of sale:
1) As a general rule, allowances shall only be made for differences
bearing a direct relation to sales. Allowances will generally not be made for
general expenses.




221 Id. 49 (Ballbearings II ); Minebea, Judgment of the Court 46 (Ballbearings I ); Nachi,
Judgment of the Court 36 (Ballbearings II ).
222 NSK, Judgment of the Court 47. In Minebea, the Court concluded:
Indeed it is clear from Minebea's own assertions that the expenses which it claims should
have been deducted from the normal value are general expenses. Article 2(10) provides that
allowances will "generally" not be made in respect of such expenses, and the applicant has not
established the existence of any special circumstance capable of justifying an exception to that
general rule.
Minebea, Judgment of the Court 45 (Ballbearings II ). In Nachi, the Court reached a similar
conclusion: "En effet, celles-ci [i.e., Article 2(10)(c)] excluent en g~nral les ajustements pour des
ditrerences dans les frais administratifs et Nachi n'a prouv6 l'existence d'aucune circonstance par-
ticuli~re de nature a justifier une d6rogation A ]a r6gle ainsi pose." Nachi, Judgment of the Court
35 (Ballbearings 1 ).
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capable of justifying an exception to the general rule, allowances for differ-
ences in costs which do not bear a direct relationship to sales may also be
made.
Unfortunately, since the Court found that none of the parties had estab-
lished such "special circumstances," there is no guidance whatsoever as
to what may constitute proof of the existence of such circumstances, or
what those circumstances might be. Moreover, the Court has not given
any guidance as to the types of overhead and general expenses that may
be allowed, nor whether there are any limitations as to the amounts al-
lowed. This is an unfortunate situation which the Court could have
avoided by clarifying these points.
The likely result is that it will be left to the Commission and Council
to determine the answers (if any) to the above questions. At the risk of
being cynical, based on previous practice one can easily imagine that the
EEC institutions will construe the exception quite strictly. Since the in-
stitutions will then be analyzing "complex economic situations" when
they interpret the exception, the Remia case could imply that the Court
will limit its review to questions of procedure and manifest errors of
fact.223 If this were to take place, the entire interpretation of EEC sub-
stantive antidumping law would be left to the virtually unfettered discre-
tion of the Commission. This is an unnecessary and unwarranted
possibility.
This part of the Ballbearings 11 judgment seems to be a case of "bad
facts make bad law." Clearly the applicants did not present detailed re-
quests for adjustments, nor did they give evidence of "special circum-
stances." As is discussed below, there are later appeals where the facts
and issues are much more clearly presented. It can only be hoped that
the Court will be prepared to revise its thinking on this issue of fair
comparison.
223 See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. The Court appears to be backing further
away from realistic judicial review in this portion of its reasoning, and the institutions are in fact
seeking such an interpretation of Remia and Ballbearings 11. In the oral arguments for Electronic
Typewriters, infra note 224 (in which the author represented one of the applicants), the Queen's
Counsel representing the Council urged the Court to extend its deference in "complex economic
situations" not only to the "special circumstances" exception, but more generally to all appraisals of
fact. He argued that antidumping investigations are inherently appraisals of complex economic situ-
ations, and that the Court should therefore limit its review of the institutions' discretionary decisions
accordingly. In his view, all questions of methodologies, allowances, cost allocations, etc., should be
left to the Commission's discretion and should not be reviewed unless the results are "manifestly
unreasonable." This is an extraordinary and unjustified assertion of authority.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF BALLBEARINGS 11 ON EEC LAW
AND TRADE POLICY
Ballbearings II is clearly a major victory for the Commission and
Council. In virtually every single procedural and substantive point, the
Court either has ruled in favor of the institutions or has declined to rule,
leaving those subjects to the institutions' discretion. On the critical sub-
ject of symmetry and the requirement of a fair comparison under Article
2(9), the Court has given little guidance. Whether it will give any gui-
dance on this issue in the Electronic Typewriter cases224 or the Japanese
Photocopier cases221 is an open question, particularly in light of Ballbear-
ings 1I. For the moment, it is up to the Commission and Council to take
the next moves in this respect.
The Commission and Council have yet to follow the lead of their
United States counterparts on these issues. Recognizing the critical im-
portance of this subject in the administration of the United States an-
tidumping laws, and realizing that substantial fairness required that
action be taken, the United States legislature and the appropriate admin-
istrative authorities have taken steps to deal with this problem of cost
comparison and administrative discretion through implementation of
policy directives coupled with the application of the laws and policies at
the administrative level.226
Therein lies a major difference between United States and EEC
practice in this area: while the United States practice has recognized the
comparison problem, attempted to reach a fair policy result, and has im-
224 Oral arguments in Electronic Typewriters were held on September 22-23, 1987, with a judg-
ment expected in 1988. The individual cases are: Brother Indus., Ltd. v. Council, 28 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 235) 4 (1985); Tokyo Elec. Co. v. Council, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 242) 5
(1985); Silver Seiko Ltd. v. Council, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 260) 4 (1985); Canon, Inc. v.
Council, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 266) 9 (1985); Sharp Corp. v. Council, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 307) 5 (1985).
225 These actions, known collectively as Japanese Photocopiers, were filed mostly in June 1987,
but no judgment would be expected for several years. Many of the same issues presented in Elec-
tronic Typewriters would be dealt with in these appeals: Canon, Inc. v. Council; Mita Indus. Co. v.
Council; Ricoh Co. v. Council; Matsushita Elec. Trading Co. v. Council; Konishiroku Photo Indus.
Co. v. Council; Sanyo Elec. Co. v. Council; Minolta Camera Co. v. Council; Sharp Corp. v. Council.
The petitions and main contentions of the applicants are reported at 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
225) 3-10 (1987).
226 The United States Court of Appeals recognized this need when it stated in SCM I:
Although the statute expressly requires a direct relationship between the differences in circum-
stances of sale and adjustment to foreign market value, we cannot conclude that the administer-
ing authority acted either beyond its authority or unreasonably in promulgating the offset. The
offset does permit negation of one specific statutory adjustment of exporter's sales price, but
does so to achieve a broader statutory purpose otherwise frustrated because of the alternative
statutory methods of computing United States price.
SCM 1, 713 F.2d at 1579. For background on these actions, see supra note 188.
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plemented those policies through the application of its laws, the EEC
reaction has been virtually the opposite. The EEC authorities are aware
that the symmetry issue is critically important, but they have declined to
deal with it openly. 2 7 The Community institutions know that the ab-
sence of symmetry in dumping calculations has prejudiced exporters sub-
stantially and unfairly, yet they have gone even further by inventing
theories which exacerbate its effects.228 Rather than taking steps to reach
a fair resolution of this problem, they hide behind the regulation and
claim that it forces them to act in this way. 2 9 At the bottom of it all is
one conclusion which is perhaps as equally important as the others: in
the United States, there is meaningful substantive judicial review of the
implementation of antidumping policies and laws; in the EEC, at least
based upon present indications, there is none." °
In Ballbearings 11, the Court has chosen not to rule upon certain
"complex economic situations"-which in antidumping law could mean
virtually all substantive matters-but has left those matters to the discre-
tion of the Commission and Council.231 Based upon the Court's previous
procedural judgments, and if the deference of Ballbearings 11 is extended
to other cases, it would seem that the Commission and Council would
have unbridled discretion in substantive matters, provided they give an
explanation of what they are doing (and even that proviso appears to
have been limited by Ballbearings 11).232 In such circumstances, when-
ever the institutions wanted to "find" high dumping margins, they might
simply make arbitrary and unreasonable interpretations of facts and in-
voke the proper regulations. If seen as "complex economic situations,"
such manifestly unjust and improper actions could be neither defended
against nor appealed.
EEC antidumping law has reached a worrisome stage. Previously,
observers bemoaned the role of the Commission as police officer, prose-
227 For example, they still maintain that the EEC adjustment rules are neutral. See J. BESELER &
A. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 95-96.
228 For example, the new "5% rule" and the "single entity" theory which increased dumping
margins significantly are at issue in the Electronic Typewriters rulings, supra note 69. These rulings
are now on appeal. See supra note 224.
229 See supra note 228; see also J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 92-93.
230 See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
231 By its references to Remia, [1987] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 1, and Faust, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 3745, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8878, as well as the implied
limitations placed on Allied 11, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,200, the Commission and Council
have been given substantial freedom in the area of trade law and policy.
232 See supra note 231. Unfortunately, it seems that the attitude of certain EEC officials is that
they may do as they like now in antidumping proceedings, since such proceedings always involve
"complex economic situations." Such attitudes are the regrettable consequence of the Court's seem-
ing refusal to face these issues.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 8:365(1987)
cutor, and judge. The Court has now added to those three roles that of
interpreter of "complex economic situations." '33 Such a grant of discre-
tion is gratuitous and unnecessary, and one can only expect the Commis-
sion to expand its use of the antidumping rules as a policy tool.
Certainly, it must avoid gross errors of fact and must give a plausible
explanation of what it is doing,234 but beyond those minimal limits the
Commission would be allowed to use the discretionary tools given it by
the legal system to accomplish policy objectives in the ways it sees fit.
The earlier procedural improvements insisted upon by the Court merely
give the system the appearance of due process and substantial justice.235
The Court's ruling in favor of the institutions on all of the issues
presented in Ballbearings, and its failure to grapple seriously with these
questions of statutory interpretation, do not bode well for the future.
V. CONCLUSION
The "judicialization" of trade laws which has transformed them
from arbitrary and somewhat mysterious proceedings into a semblance of
due process and legal order has been a trend noted by various observers
and commentators.236 As has been illustrated here, in the EEC there has
been a trend towards greater disclosure and clarification of the guide-
lines.2 37 Judicial review played an important role in bringing EEC an-
tidumping law out of its earlier "dark ages."' 238 In the area of procedural
reforms, judicial review played a useful part, and may have contributed
to a measure of "judicialization" in EEC trade law.2 39
Ballbearings 11 has stunted-if not stopped-that process of trans-
formation in the EEC. Indeed, too much "judicialization" is seen by the
233 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
234 See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing Remia, [1987] 1 Common Mkt. L.
R. 1, and that case's review standard).
235 See supra note 231.
236 The term "judicialization" is derived from an article by Ehrenhaft, The "Judicialization" of
Trade Law, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 595 (1981). In the view of Taylor & Vermulst, supra note 39,
at 75, trade law has become increasingly "judicialized" since 1980. Id. at 69.
237 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
239 See Bourgeois, supra note 58, at 584-87. Bourgeois feels that EEC antidumping cases are
progressively becoming more "adjudicative-like processes," a trend to which he ascribes four factors:
A first factor is the way in which the procedure itself is organized in line with the require-
ments of the 1979 GATT Antidumping Code, which is itself indebted to U.S. models. A second
factor is the presence of trade laywers [sic], who have a natural tendency to change their clients
into litigants. A third factor is the change of heart of the Court of Justice that has opened the
door to judicial review. A fourth factor is the growing proportion of cases leading to the impo-
sition of anti-dumping duties rather than price undertakings. Such cases are more contentious
and the corresponding decisions need to be drafted more rigorously.
Id. at 586.
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EEC authorities as something to be avoided.24 To them, it is "of crucial
importance to preserve a degree of flexibility in the application of an an-
tidumping law.""24 Ballbearings 11 has certainly delivered that flexibility
to them. Indeed, in this author's view, excessive discretion has been left
in the hands of the EEC institutions. The rule of law, with its attendant
safeguards, has been limited severely.
242
Through Ballbearings II and its predecessors, the EEC judicial re-
view system has created an appearance of propriety while at the same
time allowing the EEC institutions to create an arbitrary system useful as
a policy tool.24 3 The procedural reforms demanded by earlier Court de-
cisions have given this system an aura of credibility. Yet this system,
with its facade of credibility, can be and is being used by the Commission
and Council in an arbitrary and biased manner to pursue the whims of
protectionist policies.2" In Ballbearings II we have seen the failure of
the European Court of Justice to act as an effective balance and re-
straining force for the rule of law.
Antidumping laws are supposed to be addressed against an "unfair"
trade practice, and supportive of fair and liberalized trade.245 However,
the EEC's fair trade laws, and particularly the antidumping rules, are
being used in arbitrary and deceptive ways. One author has asked the
question: How fair is fair trade?24 6 At the moment, the answer in the
EEC is that fairness and justice are sorely lacking. Both the Commission
240 Id. at 586-87.
241 Id. at 587.
242 The primacy of the rule of law, whereby the government institutions are to be neutral enforc-
ers and arbiters of the laws, seems to be sorely lacking in EEC antidumping law. This absence is a
significant contrast to the United States approach:
One of the most pervasive aspects of U.S. trade policy is the emphasis which is given to the rule
of law. The government has approached trade issues by seeking to lay down rules of conduct
and attempting to enforce them impartially, through adjudicative procedures. At the interna-
tional level the U.S. government has pressed for agreements-multilateral and bilateral-which
codify, in ever-increasing detail, courses of commercial conduct considered mutually unaccept-
able. Domestically the Congress has enacted a series of legal remedies designed to respond to
unfair trade practices.
This phenomenon reflects the expectation that the law itself, rather than the policies of any
particular administration, is to fix the basic parameters within which America's international
trade is to be conducted. For America's trading partners, which have parliamentary forms of
government, the discretion granted to the governing party to direct trade and structure the
national economy is far greater.
Howell & Wolff, supra note 5, at 3-9.
243 See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
244 See, eg., Hindley, EC Imports of VCRs from Japan: A Costly Precedent, 20 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 168 (1986)(discussing the use of the antidumping laws as a trade policy instrument which could
accommodate the conflicting political interests); Stegemann, Anti-Dumping Policy and the Con-
sumer, 19 L WORLD TRADE L. 466 (1985)(describing antidumping measures being used as a policy
device under conditions that do not involve danger of predatory behavior).
245 J. BESELER & A. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at vi.
246 Nicolaides, supra note 1.
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and Council, as well as the Court, need to take decisive steps to address
and to correct this problem.
VI. AFTERWORD
After this Article was completed, on March 8, 1988, Advocate Gen-
eral Sir Gordon Slynn presented his advisory opinion to the Court in
Electronic Typewriters.247 He has recommended that the Court rule in
favor of the Council and dismiss the exporters' applications for annul-
ment. Continuing the trend in Ballbearings 11, his position appears to be
that the Commission and Council should be given deference in an-
tidumping proceedings because such proceedings are "complex economic
situations." If the Court follows the Advocate General's opinion, many
of the difficult and potentially abusive situations forecast by this Article
could materialize. The Court's judgment is expected later in 1988.
247 See supra note 224.
